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498A IPC

October 29, 2010 1 comment

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Categories: IPC 498A

Chitradurga judge faces dowry case

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Chitradurga-judge-faces-dowry-case/articleshow/6800918.cms

MYSORE: Police on Saturday registered a complaint against a judge attached to the Chitradurga district court on charges of dowry harassment.

DCP (crime) Rajendra Prasad told STOI that Vidya, a legal adviser, has accused her husband Shivashankar, in-laws and the judge, Shashikala, of harassing her for dowry. Shashikala is Shivashankar’s sister.

Police have filed a case under sections of Indian Penal Code and the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Categories: Other news

Important Perjury Citations

Laxminarayan Deepak Ranjan Das vs K.K. Jha And Ors. on 16 April, 1999

Section 340. of the Code incorporates following principles :

(i) Only cases where Courts, on objective consideration of the facts and circumstances are of honest belief and opinion that interests of justice require the laying of a complaint, should form subject of an enquiry.

(ii) Conducting preliminary enquiry or dispensing with it is not mandatory, but is discretionary.

(iii) A proceeding under the provision is an independent and different proceeding from that of the original sessions case.

(iv) The proceeding being penal in nature, in accordance with principles of natural justice the accused should be issued show cause notice to afford a reasonable opportunity to establish by adducing oral arid documentary evidence that it is not expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute him.

(v) As a condition precedent to filing a complaint; the Court should record a finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should be made….

(vi) The provision to record a finding is not merely discretionary but is mandatory, for, an appeal lies against the order of the Court.

(vii) The order recording such a finding must be a speaking one supported by valid and justifiable grounds to enable the appellate Court to know the material on which the Court formed the opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice to launch a prosecution.

(viii) The language recording the finding as contemplated under the provision must be such that it leaves no doubt that it was a fit and proper case.

(ix) It is incumbent on the Court to give a specific finding before making a complaint.

(x) The omission or failure to record a finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice to enquire into the offence is not a mere irregularity curable under Sections 464 and 465 of the Code as it goes to the root of the matter and the Court will have no jurisdiction to file a complaint without recording such a finding.

8. Before an order is made under Section 340 of the Code there must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise or suspicion for directing a judicial enquiry. Before the proceedings under Section 340 to be instituted there must be direct evidence fixing the offence upon the persons whom it is sought to charge either in the preliminary enquiry or in the earlier proceedings out of which the enquiry arises. It is not sufficient that the evidence in the earlier case may induce Some sort of suspicion that these persons had been guilty of an offence but there must be distinct evidence of the commission of an offence by such persons. A complaint under this section should not be made against a person where the indications of his guilt do not amount to anything more than mere suspicion.

10. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in K. Karunakaran v. T.V. Bachara Warner AIR 1978 SC 290: (1978 Cri LJ 339) in a proceeding under Section 340(1) of the Code the reasons recorded in the principal case, in which a false statement has been made, have a great bearing and indeed action is taken having regard to the overall opinion formed by the Court in the earlier proceedings. The only question at an enquiry under Section 340(1) of the Code is whether a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted, may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the specified offence and whether it is also expedient in the interest of justice to take such action. The party may choose to place all its materials before the Court at this stage, but if it does not, it will not be, estopped from doing so later if the trial of prosecution is sanctioned by the Court. An enquiry under Section 340(1) of the Code is in the nature of affording a locus paenitentiae to a person and if at that stage the Court chooses to take action, it does not mean that he will not have full opportunity in due course of the process of justice to establish his innocence.

 

Sri Chand vs State Of U.P. on 28 March, 2003

2. The first appeal from order No. 46 of 1985 preferred under Section 83 of Lunacy Act read with Section 341/195(4), Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 19-10-1984 passed under Section 340, Cr.P.C. in Misc. Case No. 285 of 1982 (Madan Lal v. Sri Chand) was finally disposed of by the District Judge, Azamgarh on 18-3-1983 where the District Judge has observed that Sri Chand had filed a false affidavit indicating that Madan Lal happened to be his real brother. On that aspect the District Judge had indicated for issuance of show cause notice for institution of a criminal complaint against him. The miscellaneous application No: 205 of 1983 has been originated from the said observation in respect of the alleged false affidavit filed by Sri Chand before the lower Court. Undoubtedly Sri Chand has filed an affidavit in Misc. Case No. 285 of 1982 which is allegedly to be a false affidavit wherein he had averred that Madan Lal happened to be his real brother whereas in another litigation regarding partitions of property Sri Chand the appellant before this Court has made and categorically asserted that Madan Lal is not his brother, that litigation was pending from much before the instant proceeding in which the impugned order in question and the cognizance of alleged false affidavit was noted on this aspect learned lower Court took a view that Sri Chand has filed a false affidavit. Learned lower Court has also made observations in the order dated 19-10-1984 that learned counsel for Sri Chand had very humbly stated before the lower Court that he has not done so intentionally with a view to gain something. However, learned District Judge had viewed such averment of Sri Chand presented on affidavit that definitely it was a false statement in the knowledge of Sri Chand and has been viewed that Sri Chand has deliberately filed a false affidavit touching his relationship with Madan Lal. Learned lower Court has also noted that Sri Chand was not instrumental in drafting of the affidavit as it was got prepared by the then learned counsel engaged in that case and Sri Chand had only made a signature at the bottom of the plain paper and as a common litigant and he could not make an attempt to peruse or he could not realise the necessity; of perusing the entire contents of the affidavit. According to Sri Chand he had simply put a signature under the affidavit in a blind folded manner without making any endeavourance to know the contents. However, learned lower Court has ignored these aspects in the matter and has viewed that such phenomena is uncommon and has considered that it a fit case where criminal’ complaint was to be filed against Sri Chand for filing false affidavit in the miscellaneous case.

 

State: Represented By Its … vs Baddepudi Penchalaiah, on 11 October, 2007

In the impugned judgment, the learned Special Judge observed that PW.1 gave false evidence before the trial Court, which is different from the version given by him before the Magistrate under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, he is liable to be prosecuted for perjury under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

In view of the admission and also in view of the affidavit and the records now filed by the respondents admitting the fact that the service record showed the date of birth of the petitioner as 12.7.1948, the respondent authorities are prima facie guilty of contempt and perjury.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the fact that the petitioner has attained superannuation after completing 60 years of service and has collected retiral dues there is no point to initiate contempt proceedings and or perjury proceeding under Section 340 Cr.P.C. at this stage. However, it will be in the interest of justice to direct the respondent Management to pay a cost of Rs.20,000/- to the petitioner since he suffered at the hands of the respondents authority for making false statement on oath. It is also directed that if the retiral dues has not been released the same should be released within a period of one month from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. This writ petition is accordingly disposed of with the aforesaid direction.”

 

 

Balshiram Rambhau Awate vs The State Of Maharashtra on 23 March, 1977

6. However, we are sorry to find that the learned trial Judge having taken a correct view of the situation did not proceed logically to issue notices to at least three of the prosecution witnesses for having committed perjury. Two courses were open to him. He could have taken action under Section 344 Cr.PC summarily and arranged to punish them there and then. It was also open to him to hold a summary inquiry Under Section 340 (1) of the Cr.PC and decide whether a complaint should be filed. In this regard the learned trial Judge has shown some inaction. We find that the Police Patil and the Kotwal being public servants could not be allowed to run away scot-free from the Court in spite of committing perjury. In the same manner victim Damo- dar who has received several injuries at the hands of his brother cannot play fast and loose with the Court. We are thus satisfied that it is necessary to take action against these three witnesses for having committed the offence of perjury. We would therefore hold a preliminary inquiry in that behalf as contemplated by Sub-section (1) of Section 340 Cr.PC

 

Baiju Kumar vs D.E.O. on 10 July, 2003

9. The Manager has raised some new contentions in the counter affidavit which he has not raised either in O.P. No. 14830/99 or before the Government. They are regarding the ineligibility including financial position of the petitioner etc. Those contentions have been raised as a result of an afterthought as a desperate attempt to sustain Ext.P5. In those efforts, he has made conflicting pleas which may amount to commission of perjury warranting an order under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. directing his trial for perjury by the competent Criminal Court. In O.P. No. 14830/99, the Manager has pleaded regarding the submission of the application by the petitioner in the following manner:-

 

 

Jose Kuruvinakunnel vs A.T. Jose on 6 December, 1996

3. The revision petitioner herein filed O. P. (Misc) 7/85 before the Munsiffs Court, Pala under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure. Code against the respondent herein who is the 3rd defendant in O.S. 68/83 alleging that he had manipulated the official records of the Panchayat and had given false evidence before Court and as such he has committed the offence punishable under Sections 191 and 192 of the IPC.

4. After trial the Munsiffs Court dismissed the Suit. The Munsiffs Court also dismissed the O. P. (Misc.) 7/85 holding that there is no sufficient material to institute proceedings against the respondent herein under Section 340 of the Cri. P. C.

30. Therefore, it is clear that prosecution can be initiated by resorting to Section 340 of Cr. P. C. only in cases where it is expedient in the interests of justice to prosecute the party and prima facie evidence is adduced in that behalf and the provisions of Section 340 of Cr. P. C. cannot be resorted to lightly on the mere allegations, or to vindicate personal vendetta.

29. In the decision in Suntokh Singh v. Izhar Hussain AIR 1973 SC 2190 : 1973 Cri LJ 1176 the Supreme Court observed as follows (Para 11):

Every incorrect or false statement does not make it incumbent on the Court to order prosecution. The Court has to exercise judicial discretion in the light of all the relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The Court orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration of justice and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely that the Court should direct prosecution.

Mahila Vinod Kumar I vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 11 July, 2008

7. This section introduces an additional alternative procedure to punish perjury by the very Court before which it is committed in place of old Section 479 A which did not have the desired effect to eradicate the evils of perjury. The salient features of this new provision are:

(1) Special powers have been conferred on two specified Courts, namely Court of Session and Magistrate of the First Class, to take cognizance of an offence of perjury committed by a witness in a proceeding before it instead of filing a complaint before a Magistrate and try and punish the offender by following the procedure of summary trials. For summary trial, see Ch. 21. 6

(2) This power is to be exercised after having the matter considered by the Court only at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order.

(3) The offender shall be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause before he is punished.

(4) The maximum sentence that may be imposed is 3 month’s imprisonment or a fine up to Rs.500 or both. (5) The order of the Court is appealable (vide S. 351). (6) The procedure in this section is an alternative to one under Sections 340-343. The Court has been given an option to proceed to punish summarily under this section or to resort to ordinary procedure by way of complaint under Section 340 so that, as for instance, where the Court is of opinion that perjury committed is likely to raise complicated questions or deserves more severe punishment than that permitted under this section or the case is otherwise of such a nature or for some reasons considered to be such that the case should be disposed of under the ordinary procedure which 7

would be more appropriate, the Court may chose to do so [vide sub-section (3)].

(7) Further proceedings of any trial initiated under this section shall be stayed and thus, any sentence imposed shall also not be executed until the disposal of an appeal or revision against the judgment or order in the main proceedings in which the witness gave perjured evidence or fabricated false evidence [vide sub-section (4)].

8. For exercising the powers under the section the Court at the time of delivery of judgment or final order must at the first instance express an opinion to the effect that the witness before it has either intentionally given false evidence or fabricated such evidence. The second condition is that the Court must come to the conclusion that in the interests of justice the witness concerned should be punished summarily by it for the offence which appears to have been committed by the witness. And the third condition is that before commencing the summary trial for punishment the witness 8must be given reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be so punished. All these conditions arc mandatory. [See Narayanswamy v. State of Muharashtra, (1971) 2 SCC 182].

 

Vittappan vs State on 9 April, 1987

10. A court directing prosecution for perjury is not vindicating the grievance of any party. The action is mainly to safeguard the prestige and the dignity of the court and to maintain the confidence of the people in the efficiency of the judicial process. What the court is mainly interested in is seeing that administration of justice and dignity of the court is not flouted. The Sessions Judge did not specifically find on which aspect the appellant gave false evidence and whether that evidence was purposely made or whether it had any real impact on the decision of the case. In fact he did not even consider whether any perjury was committed. This is evident when he refused to express any opinion on that aspect and said that what he is concerned under Section 340 is only to see whether an enquiry is necessary or not. The only opinion formed by him for filing the complaint is that interest of justice demands an. enquiry as to whether the appellant committed the offence of giving false evidence in court. I am of opinion that the Sessions Judge has not complied with the mandatory provisions of Section 340 of the Code and filed the complaint after passing the impugned order without the requisite satisfaction and without understanding the legal provision correctly. In fact the materials make it clear that this is not a fit case where it was expedient in the interest of justice to have an enquiry under Section 340 of the Code much less a prosecution. The impugned order and consequently the complaint must go.

 

Amzad Ali vs Marfat Ali Biswas And Two Ors. on 11 June, 1998

Thereafter, the defendant respondent no.l filed an application under section 340 Cr.PC before the Court of Munslf, Lalbag, praying for lodging a complaint against the plaintifi* petitioner alleging that the plaintiff petitioner fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine the aforesaid, deed of sale dated 10.3.38, knowing or having reason to believe that it was a forged document and had thereby committed an offence punishable under section 471 I.PC This application was registered as Misc. Case No.34 of 1988 of the Court of Munsiff, Lalbag.

 

Mohanlal vs State Of Rajasthan And Ors. on 1 October, 1980

 

I am, therefore, convinced that it is time that exploitation abuse and misuse of equitable jurisdiction is stopped, as founding fathers never intended it to make it an “Allaudin’s lamp” for providing protective umbrella to all inequitable evil geniuses and social parasites. Anti-soqial dishonest and unjust litigants cannot use smoke screen of ‘natural justice’ to perpetuate unnatural injustice. Tainted hands cannot be allowed to touch pure fountains of justice.

 

Sardar Harjit Singh vs Sardar Ravel Singh & Ors on 1 January, 1800

TRUTH was the hallmark of the justice delivery system which operated in the country till the establishment of the court system under British rule. The people used to tell truth and truth only without being influenced by its consequences. In the present day judicial system the truth is perhaps the biggest casualty. Unscrupulous litigants like the petitioners leave no stone unturned to mislead the quasi-judicial and judicial authorities and the courts for material gains. The entire system has become victim of such persons. In order to meet this challenge, the courts have evolved new rules, strategies CS (OS) No.690/2005 Page 16 of 23 and techniques. One such rule is that the court will not grant hearing to a person who does not approach it with clean hands. To put it differently, a person who touches the fountain of justice with the tainted hand or who makes an attempt to pollute the course of justice by making false or misleading statements or by suppressing facts must be shown the door at the threshold.”

 

Shiv Dan Singh vs State Of Rajasthan on 12 January, 1983

Mr. Khan wanted to show to me the record of Order Book of the Police Department for the year 1948, in which at Section No. 188 it is mentioned that the enlistment of the petitioner was done and his age has been mentioned as 20 years. However, it will be unnecessary to travel into any other record, because I am convinced that the very bedrock and the foundation of the allegation that the original entry was 29.11.27 is not only incorrect, but further based on some inter-polation, which is visible to a naked eye and is patent. Tainted hands cannot be allowed to touch pure fountains of Justice.

S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu vs Jagannath on 27 October, 1993

The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

Categories: Judgement

Multiple maintenance not allowed under Law-Delhi High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of Reserve: 22nd September, 2010

Date of Order: September 27, 2010

+CRL. R.P. No. 633 of 2010, CRL. M.A. NO. 15451/2010 %

27.09.2010

RENU MITTAL … Petitioner Through: Mr Shiv Charan Garg with Mr.

Imran Kha, Advs.

Versus

ANIL MITTAL & ORS. … Respondents Through: Mr O.P. Saxena, Addl. PP for the

State.

JUSTICE SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA

1. Whether reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the reporter or not?

3. Whether judgment should be reported in Digest? JUDGMENT

1. This Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner against an order dated 20th May, 2010 whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) dismissed an appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of learned Metropolitan Magistrate (MM) partly allowing the application under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2006 (‘Domestic Violence Act’ for short) and partly rejecting the application under Domestic Violence Act.

CRL. R.P. 633 OF 2010 Page 1 of 4

2. The petitioner had married the respondent in the year 2006 and a dispute arose between her and her husband soon after the marriage and in the year 2007 itself the petitioner filed a petition under Section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.) against the respondent for grant of maintenance. Learned MM awarded a maintenance of ` 6,000/- p.m. The petitioner also filed an FIR u/s 498A/406 IPC against respondent and thereafter filed an application under Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act seeking therein, apart from maintenance, compensation under various heads of ` 1.00 lakh, ` 2.00 lakh, ` 3.00 lakh and ` 5.00 lakh. She had also asked for rights of residence. The learned MM after considering the averments made by both the parties, observed that Section 12(2) of the Domestic Violence Act provides that compensation can be claimed by the parties for the injuries under civil suit as well. The petitioner had made astronomical claims for compensation without specifying grounds for different compensations in her petition. At one place the claim was of ` 1.00 lakh, at another place for ` 2.00 lakh, at third place for ` 3.00 lakh and at fourth place for ` 5.00 lakh. In support of these claims no documents etc. were filed. She also claimed Istridhan and dowry, while she had already preferred a criminal case under Section 498-A/406 of IPC against the respondent and issue of dowry demand or non return of any article was pending before the competent Court and that Court was to decide if any Istridhan/ dowry article was still with the respondent. The Court CRL. R.P. 633 OF 2010 Page 2 of 4 therefore allowed the application of the petitioner only partly to the extent of re-confirming the maintenance of ` 6,000/- p.m. and as awarded to her by the learned MM under Section 125 of Cr. P.C. dismissing the rest of the claim. Learned ASJ after going through the entire material upheld the order of MM.

3. The revision petitioner has argued that learned ASJ did not fix maintenance after considering the evidence of the parties and fixed the maintenance on the basis of order passed by the Court of MM under Section 125 of Cr. P.C.

4. It must be considered that for granting maintenance, a party can either approach the Court of MM under Domestic Violence Act soon after commission of Domestic Violence or under Section 125 Cr. P.C. claiming maintenance. The Jurisdiction for granting maintenance under Section 125 Cr. P.C. and Domestic Violence Act is parallel jurisdiction and if maintenance has been granted under Section 125 Cr. P.C. after taking into account the entire material placed before the Court and recording evidence, it is not necessary that another MM under Domestic Violence Act should again adjudicate the issue of maintenance. The law does not warrant that two parallel courts should adjudicate same issue separately. If adjudication has already been done by a Court of MM under Section 125 Cr. P.C., re-adjudication of the issue of maintenance cannot be done by a Court of MM under Domestic Violence Act. I, therefore, CRL. R.P. 633 OF 2010 Page 3 of 4 consider that learned MM was right in allowing maintenance only to the tune of ` 6,000/- p.m.

6. So far as other reliefs are concerned, the learned MM and ASJ had given liberty to the petitioner to approach the Civil Court and prove that she had suffered loss and was entitled for compensation. I find no ground to interfere with this order of learned ASJ as the order is not without jurisdiction. I also find force in the reasoning given by learned ASJ that since the matter regarding dowry articles and Istridhan was pending before another court, it was rightly not gone into by MM as it would not have been appropriate for the Court of MM under Domestic Violence Act to initiate simultaneous adjudication in respect of Istridhan and dowry articles, when another court was seized with the matter.

7. I, therefore, find no force in this petition. The petition is dismissed.

SEPTEMBER 27, 2010 SHIV NARAYAN DHINGRA, J. acm

CRL. R.P. 633 OF 2010 Page 4 of 4

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1941672/

Categories: DV Judgements, Judgement

Every allegations do not justify initiation of prosecution under 340 CRPC

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ W.P.(CRL) 286/2007

RAJKUMAR INDORIA ….. Petitioner Through Ms. Anu Mehta, Advocate.

versus

NCT OF DELHI NEW DELHI ….. Respondent Through Nemo.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA

ORDER

% 18.08.2010

CRL.M.A. No. 13869/2010

1. The writ petition filed by the petitioner for police protection to him and his family members was disposed of on 9th August, 2010. It was noticed that the petitioner was initially granted police protection in the year 2005 but police protection/PSO was subsequently withdrawn after re-assessment of the threat perception in the year 2007. The order dated 9th August, 2010 notices the fact that the threat perception of the petitioner and his family was examined by Special Cell, Delhi Police, Ministry of Home Affairs and then again by DCP (Special Cell). It was also noticed that there are some FIRs, which are registered against the petitioner.

2. Now the petitioner has filed the present application under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 stating, inter alia, that wrong and false averments have been made in the status report which amount to perjury. Learned counsel appearing for the applicant submits that FIR No. 580/2005, Police Station NDLS, Delhi was registered on the complaint of the petitioner against Mr. Ramchander Khaganwal under Section 325 and not under Section 323 of the IPC. It is further stated that the licence of Mr. Ramchander Khaganwal was cancelled in 2007 by the Northern Railway. She has relied upon In re R. Karuppan 2001 CriLJ 266.

3. These two allegations do not justify initiation of prosecution. In the order dated 9th August, 2010 several aspects and facts have been taken into consideration. The dispute between the petitioner and Mr. Ramchander Khaganwal is noticed and that there are cross FIRs. It is not expedient in the interest of justice to enquire into the alleged offence as has been observed in Pritish vs State of Maharashtra (2002) 1 SCC 253. The relevant paragraph reads:

“16. Be it noted that the court at the stage envisaged in Section 340 of the Code is not deciding the guilt or innocence of the party against whom proceedings are to be taken before the Magistrate. At that stage the court only considers whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence affecting administration of justice. In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras1 a Constitution Bench of this Court cautioned that no expression on the guilt or innocence of the persons should be made by the court while passing an order under Section 340 of the Code. An exercise of the court at that stage is not for finding whether any offence was committed or who committed the same. The scope is confined to see whether the court could then decide on the materials available that the matter requires inquiry by a criminal court and that it is expedient in the interest of justice to have it inquired into.”

4. Further, the expediency should be judged by taking into

consideration the impact that commission of such offence has on the

administration of justice. The Supreme Court has held in Iqbal Sigh

Marwah v. Meenakkshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370:

“23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words “court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”. This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. .”

5. The aforesaid submissions do not justify further proceedings under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The application is dismissed.

SANJIV KHANNA, J.

AUGUST 18, 2010

VKR

http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1721681/

Categories: Judgement